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Article 4
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Silvia Alvarez Curbelo
The article was translated from
Spanish by Blanca Vizquez.

What first comes to mind is asphalt. The
65th Infantry is the "65 th / that
inhospitable, choked thoroughfare that
runs from Río Piedras to Carolina. Not
far from Rio Piedras, though, you do
become aware of the hidden reference
point behind the smog, store signs and
countless fast food joints. A simple
memorial dedicates the avenue to the
Puerto Rican regiment, and off to one
side in the San Agustín community the
names of the streets are dedicated to
the dead and the decorated.
Despite its fallen heroes, the historical
heritage of the 65th is faint in the
national memory. The veterans of the
regiment are practically the only ones
who preserve the memory. Today, men
in their sixties maintain the war,
chronicle strikingly alive. These are the
men Pedro Flores said goodbye to as
they left for war, leaving behind their
childhood sweethearts and resigned
mothers. Edgardo Rodríguez Julia, one
of the earlier inhabitants of the "65th"
("...the 65th, still pretty desolate when
I was 11, was the incomplete promise of
social mobility") associates the street
(in Puertorriqueños) with the "studs"
and the "peacocks"; they are the tough
guys a la Daniel Santos. They are the
boys of Korea.
The distant history of the 65th begins
w ith the period of m ilitary rule
after the U.S. invasion. Founded by
congressional legislation in 1899, it was
known as the Puerto Rican Volunteer
Regiment, and fit with the anomalous
situation regarding citizenship created
by the citizenship clause of the Foraker
Law (1900). With the First World War
and the concession of U.S. citizenship in
1917, the regiment was renamed the
Puerto Rican Infantry Regiment of the
United States, and saw service in the
Panama Canal zone. In 1920 it was
renamed the 65th U.S. Infantry.
During the Second World War, the
regiment took part in the African,
Italian and French campaigns and in the
occupation of Germany. However, in
spite of its dead and wounded, the 65th
still wasn't considered a combat unit in
the conflict. Its battalions were used
principally as support troops for other
units. In the Seventh Army, the Puerto
Ricans were spoken of in a derogatory
way as "palace guards."
Isolated, considered generically unfit
for combat, the Puerto Rican soldiers
were seen through the same prism as
the Black American troops. In a racially

organized army such as that of the U.S.,
abilities and duties were determined
beforehand. After the Allied victory in
1945, the 65th returned to Puerto Rico
and was stationed in Losey Field in
Juana Diaz and Henry Barracks in Cayey.
When William Harris took charge in
1949, the image had changed little: the
65th was viewed as an ethnic unit
destined for secondary tasks.
That is how Harris remembers it in his
book Puerto Rico's Fighting 65th U.S.
Infantry. Sentimental and simplistic at
times, Harris's book gradually develops
into a powerful story. He covers two
critical years (1949-1951) in which the
regiment defined itself as a unit, giving
itself its emblematic name: the
Borinqueneers.
Actively
deployed
during the war, it became, without a
doubt, the best fighting unit in the
Korean War. Since his book is
autobiographical, one might expect
Harris to make himself the focal point
of that change. But he does not, even
though being in charge of the 65th
Infantry during those two years was
obviously Harris's moment of military
glory. Yet the colonel's role is mediated
by his perspicacious account of a process
which superseded him even while
decisively elevating his command.
Harris could not have imagined that the
65th would thus come into its own
when he apprehensively directed the
65th's most important maneuvers
in February 1950. Against all his
expectations, the 65th, in a simulated
invasion of Vieques during the so-called
Portrex Maneuvers, beat the "enemy":
the 3rd Infantry Division, the most
decorated U.S. Army division in the two
world wars. That surprise victory
intrigued the division "top brass" (How
could the "rum and coke" brigade beat
the Army's most d e co ra te d division?),
but not e n o u g h to m ake any
real d ifferen ce in its im age. The
65th remained a m arginalized unit
("hum iliated" in Harris's words),
relegated to maintenance tasks.
The fact is that something complex
had
happened
in
Vieques,
a
combination of forces and motivations
that can't really be understood in
terms of m ilitary diagnosis, things
having to do with machismo, dignity,
self love- were all definitive in forging
a powerful identity.
Four months after the maneuvers, the
Korean conflict began. On August 23rd
the regiment left San Juan. While on

the high seas, it received instructions to
go directly to Korea, skipping the
customary stopover in Japan. Korea was
no longer an "incident," as President
Truman had insisted, but a war in the
full sense of the word and every man
was needed.
The landing in Pusan coincided with the
beginning of the U.S. counter- offensive
against the spectacular advance of the
North Koreans and the guerrillas
in th e S o u th . The 65th w o u ld
soon win the nickname of the "fire
brigade" for its ubiquitous role in the
war's extensive terrain. Its fame would
spread above all when General Douglas
MacArthur's desperate campaign failed
against the renewed resistance of the
North Koreans, and Chinese volunteers
entered the conflict.
U.S. units, prematurely convinced of
their invulnerability, fell into one of the
oldest m ilitary traps, overextending
their lines almost to the Manchurian
border. When the North KoreansChinese counterattacked, the front lines
were in pandemonium. It was in the
midst of this chaos that the 65th acted
with maximum effectiveness.
While unit after unit of the Eighth Army
along with the regular forces of South
Korea were disorganized, and were
suffering astonishing rates of desertions
as their casualties mounted, the 65th
displayed
incredible
coherence.
Cemented by a sense of solidarity, they
were sustained by a support system
fueled by letters from home, foodstuffs
sent by hundreds of mothers, girlfriends
and wives, and songs dedicated to the
combatants. As they struggled against
the cold in the hills, they dreamt of
festivals and folk songs, nostalgic for
their distant homeland.
Further reinforced by the group of
Puerto Rican non-commissioned officers
(NCO's) who "translated" the war for
the vulnerable privates, the soldiers of
the 65th displayed a distinct identity.
On Christmas Eve 1950, U.S. troops, in
full retreat, were being pushed to the
sea, which MacArthur's press corps tried
to reconcile with the trium phant
predictions of prior weeks. Am ong
them were the elite troops of the First
Marine Infantry Division. It was the 65th
that protected the rear guard of those
Marines, the Puerto Ricans being the
last to leave the "Dunkirk" of
Humhang. The Puerto Ricans celebrated
Christmas alongside the transports

fleeing south. The Third Division
received a presidential citation for their
actions in saving the bulk of the U.S.
forces on the Korean front. Inexplicably,
according to Harris, the 6Sth was not
singled out and none of its members
received the Medal of Honor in spite of
their proven acts of valor.
The following months of war were
significantly different from the first
phase of the fighting. On the one
hand, differences between General
MacArthur's anti-Chinese and "gungho"
rhetoric and the Truman administration's
fears of a Third World War if the Soviets
intervened, resulted in the summary
removal of MacArthur in April of 1951.
On the other hand, the U.S. offensive,
which succeeded in gaining back a
great part of the territory lost in
December, did not alter the balance of
forces, and established instead a
demarcation line at the 38th parallel.
The war took on other exigencies:
territory had to be won and maintained
against the constant threat of invading
"hordes" of Chinese. It was the most
violent phase of the war and the 65th
would again prove to be the most
mobile unit in a confused theater of
war, with its changing orders and
ferocious
resistance.
As
"fire
extinguishers" the 65th undertook an
intricate web of maneuvers that sent
them from one end of the peninsula to
another without significant rest
periods. Only its considerable collective
inner strength can explain how the
regiment succeeded in surviving the
turn of events.
The start of the peace talks in June of
1951 marked the last stage of the war.
The Korean conflict became a war of
static positionings, of trench warfare
over minuscule modifications. But as
documented so clearly in the First World
War, under such circumstances the
degree of irrationality rises and
psychological fatigue sets in, as
casualties mount over insignificant
gains that could only be momentarily
retained. As the nature of the war was
changing, the Pentagon accelerated the
rotation of troops. While shortening
the time troops stayed at the front, this
tactic also undermined the stability of
fighting units.
As the irrationality of the war grew, and
the networks of solidarity and
mediations between the front and the
U.S. high command dissolved, the 65th
became totally destabilized and exposed.
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The dramatic events of September and
October of 1952, involving members of
the 65th were directly related to the
loss of identity suffered by the
regiment, eroded as it was by an
incomprehensible war that could not be
won but was measured by the taking of
one or another hill mere pawns at the
negotiating table. Facing superior
forces which dominated the terrain,
various Puerto Rican fighters sent on
suicide missions refused to fight, taking
the position that orders which were
impossible to follow should not be
obeyed. Paradoxically, the decisions
made in the hills at Kelly and Jackson
can be also read as collective
affirmations, as a positioning of identity
in the face of that irrationality. Puerto
Rican identity was thus affirmed by
both participation and by absence in
these two sterile North Korean hills.
Two minor military operations, today
no more than casual references in the
books about the Korean war, illuminate
all the complexities and antagonisms
surrounding the 65th. Everything would
change for the regiment after the
fateful events at Jackson Heights on

October 28th, 1952. At the end of that
day the lieutenant in charge of
Company A, on temporary assignment
to the Second Battalion of the
Regiment, and dozens of Puerto Rican
soldiers were arrested. They were
accused of knowingly evading battle
with the enemy and of disobeying the
orders of their superiors. The response
of the U.S. high command was
implacable: more than 90 soldiers were
tried and court marshalled. The trials
were quick; the defense was hastily
assembled. With one exception all those
accused were found guilty. The
sentences varied, but in general they
were disproportionately severe (some
received 16-year sentences), in spite of
inconclusive proof and the confused
testimony of witnesses.
The press of the time tells of a nation
reacting with disbelief and pain at the
accusations of cowardice and desertion,
and
feeling
diminished
and
overwhelmed. A nation moving
inconclusively between two cultures
experienced one of its icons as fallen.
The press also records the discomfort of
a government having to manage an
affair that inevitably had racial over
tones and smacked of old colonial
relations at a time when a new state
apparatus the Commonwealth-was
being inaugurated. The Puerto Rican
cases also provided the newly installed
second party the Puerto Rican
Independence
Party
(PlP)-the
opportunity to open its first political
debate. From the senatorial chambers,
the leader of the PIP, Gilberto
Concepción de Gracia, would force the
government of Luis Muñoz Marín to
intervene and request clemency for the
convicted soldiers. Concepción de
Gracia personally defended more than
30 soldiers in their appeals process.
A reading of the 65th and its role calls
for predictable categories racism,
colonial troops in imperial armed
forces, wars of attrition that are valid,
useful and necessary. Notwithstanding, I
think it also imperative to recover and
reclaim the memory of the 65th as an
illuminating cultural space in which “in
some way" as Antonio Benitez Rojo
would say, nationality was highlighted.
Even in a zone that is totally "anti
national" the Army of the United States
national affirmation operates in
unforseen and profound ways.
Reprinted article. Cenrto Journal of the Center for
Puerto Rican Studies.

